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Abstract
What is the strategic role of membership in an intergovernmental group with
unanimity requirements if the group negotiates with an external player in a setting
with incomplete information? Being in such a group has a strategic effect compared
to negotiating as a stand-alone player and reduces the demands of the outside player.
Group membership lends additional bargaining power. Negotiating as a group may
also cause more inefficiencies due to bargaining failure, and this may harm also the
intergovernmental group. We uncover the role of preference alignment and prefer-
ence independence between members of the coalition group for equilibrium payoffs
and welfare effects. In this analysis, we also distinguish between coalition groups with
and without side payments. Overall, coalition groups tend to perform well for the
members of the coalition group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations,
particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition group are not always
perfectly aligned.
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bargaining, incomplete information, coalitions, groups, strategic bargaining power
Joint decision making is a concept with a considerable history of thought in political
science and economics. Scharpf’s (1988) seminal article set the stage for much of the
discussion that followed. He argued that the unanimity requirement for policy
reform may cause inefficient policy outcomes and highlighted the role of intergo-
vernmental bargaining. Scharpf’s analysis and much of the discussion it generated
focuses on the quality of decision making inside a group of governments if they can
depart from the status quo only by unanimity. We do not focus on the quality of
internal decision processes inside an intergovernmental group. Rather, we consider
the implications of the structure of these internal decision processes for negotiations
by this intergovernmental group with nonmembers of the group.
More specifically, we discuss three different types of decision structures of the
intergovernmental group consisting of two players (A and B) with respect to propos-
als made by a nonmember of the group, which is player S. First, one decision struc-
ture makes both players A and B negotiate as stand-alone players. Player S negotiates
independently with each of them. Second, for a low degree of integration, A and B
negotiate as an intergovernmental group: the offers made by S are either both
accepted by unanimous consensus or both rejected. We call this type of intergovern-
mental group a coalition with weak ties. Third, players A and B may be more fully
integrated and maximize their joint welfare when replying to S’s offer and where
they can make side payments to each other. We call this type of intergovernmental
group a coalition with strong ties.
Negotiations by the set of member countries of the European Union (EU)
with third parties in different policy areas provide examples for the different
negotiation structures. On some policy issues, each member country acts as a
stand-alone player. Tax policy is largely a matter of the individual nation-states
within Europe. Accordingly, tax treaties such as information exchange agree-
ments or double taxation treaties are negotiated and enacted on a strictly bilat-
eral basis between single-member countries and the respective nonmember
country. On some other issues, the EU is the official counterpart in negotiations
with a third party, but the individual member countries may still have important
veto rights. International climate negotiations may serve as an example for
negotiations by the member states as a coalition.1 The negotiations and deci-
sions about the financial rescue packages for Greece in May 2010, and future
rescue decisions in the context of the European Fiscal Stabilization Fund or the
European Stability Mechanism have also followed this pattern. Positive deci-
sions on rescue packages required unanimous consensus.2
We formally model the role of coalitions in a bargaining framework with one-
sided incomplete information. One player S bargains with two other players A and
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B. Player S has two items to which he does not attribute any value. One of these items
he offers to A, the other to B. This is done without knowledge of the buyers’
willingness to pay for the items. He or she makes simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it
offers. We compare the asking prices, A’s and B’s payoffs and overall efficiency
in the equilibrium for three bargaining regimes. We identify two major effects of
coalitions with weak or strong ties, compared to the stand-alone regime: a strategic
effect and an efficiency effect. The unanimity requirement may induce player S to
reduce his demands in the negotiations—hence, the unanimity requirement may shift
bargaining power away from the proposing player S toward the members of the
intergovernmental group. This is the strategic effect of acting as a coalition. The
unanimity requirement also changes the set of possible asking prices that would
be accepted by the players A and B. The set of combinations of prices for which effi-
ciency enhancing trade takes place is changed. This describes the efficiency effect.
We determine the conditions for when the increased bargaining power can overcom-
pensate the enhanced efficiency cost for the intergovernmental group and when this
can yield a higher expected payoff for the intergovernmental group. The determi-
nants are (1) the alignment or independence of the preferences of members of the
intergovernmental group, (2) the nature of incomplete information, and (3) the struc-
ture of intergovernmental decision making inside the coalition.
While we have in mind other governments negotiating with the intergovernmen-
tal group, similar issues of commitment power have been debated in the context of
whether governments are able to commit to policies that are not time consistent.3
Consider, for example, articles dealing with the EU. Jupille (1999) focuses on the
issue of unanimity versus majority voting inside the EU for international outcomes
in which the EU is one of several players. While Jupille’s focus on majority voting
versus unanimity as well as the decision framework differs from ours, he does con-
sider the importance of intergovernmental decision rules for the group’s bargaining
power and for the type of outcomes that can be expected to emerge. Meunier (2000)
finds that the bargaining process between the EU and its partners in international
negotiations is affected by the process of decision making inside the EU. She dis-
cusses veto power by each individual member and majority rule as the first dimen-
sion, considerations of delegation of power to a common negotiator as the second
dimension, and the type of bargaining process as the third dimension, using specific
cases of conflict between the United States and the EU on matters of trade. Groenleer
and van Schaik (2007) point to the importance of preference congruence among the
member states of the EU for international negotiations.
There are articles that explore more general applications. For example, a formal
analysis of the power of veto players in a country for the state’s bargaining power in
international interactions is found in Kroll and Shogren (2008). If some extreme
groups in a country have veto power, this changes the set of agreeable Pareto
improvements and generates strategic commitment power. Kroll and Shogren’s
analysis is one with perfect and complete information. Manzini and Mariotti
(2005) consider several heterogeneous players negotiating with a single player under
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complete information. The two sides make alternating offers as in a noncooperative
bargaining game. The authors show that this bargaining game has an equilibrium
outcome similar to the one in which the coalition delegates bargaining to the mem-
ber of the group who is most reluctant to accept an agreement. In a companion arti-
cle, Manzini and Mariotti (2009) show how incomplete information can modify this
effect. Bond and Eraslan (2009) also consider a group negotiating with a single
player, assuming that the group votes on this player’s proposal and accepts outcomes
either by majority voting or by a unanimity requirement. In their framework, the
members of the group only receive a signal about how beneficial a positive outcome
is for them, and the voting rule is used as an information aggregation device,
related to Condorcet’s jury theorem, but with strategic voting as in Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1998).
In all these approaches, the negotiations are about one single item, something that
could be seen as a public good to the group. Our approach considers bargaining in
which each of the group members could make a deal with the single player on an
individual basis. We compare individual trade relations with group decisions (with
and without intragroup transfers). We allow for some structure on the preference
distribution within an alliance and exploit the role of this distribution, comparing
individual decision making and two types of group decision making. Our analysis
takes the governance structures as given and compares equilibrium outcomes for
different structures.4
The model laid out in this article has quite a number of features common to a
broad set of collective political action problems. This is especially the case with
respect to the multiple concept framework that Scharpf (2000) has proposed as being
useful for interpreting and understanding the distinctive forms of governance within
the European polity. Outside of interactive processes that exclusively involve mutual
adjustment, Scharpf suggests that there is a hierarchical set of decision dynamics that
mark this polity. At the bottom, and involving the lowest level of institutionalization,
are intergovernmental negotiations; at the top is the supranational hierarchical mode,
and in the middle is the joint-decision mode.
Negotiations in the intergovernmental mode are fully controlled by national gov-
ernments, and the agreements these countries reach require the consent of all as does
their implementation. In stark contrast, hierarchical direction completely centralizes
competencies at the European level; they are exercised by supranational actors
alone. In practice, these functions are performed by institutions such as the European
Central Bank which, under most circumstances, are insulated from the influence of
any democratically accountable agents. Sandwiched between these two extremes is
the joint-decision mode, often labeled the ‘‘joint-decision trap’’ (Scharpf 1988)
because of its putative tendency to produce inefficient outcomes that the parties are
incapable of escaping. This arises from two related conditions: (1) the central or
encompassing government policy decisions flow only from agreement of the consti-
tuent governments and (2) the agreement of the latter occurs only with unanimity or
near-unanimity. Scharpf (1988) has argued that this mode has the tendency to
Konrad and Cusack 923
generate inefficient outcomes and that its legitimacy is undermined because of the
role of nonaccountable supranational actors, such as the commission, to the extent
that they can ‘‘compel national governments to change their positions on politically
salient issues’’ (Scharpf 2000, 19). Elsewhere (Scharpf 2006, 850–51), however, he
stresses the beneficial role that the commission plays since it has the monopoly on
legislative initiative thereby tremendously reducing the transaction costs involved in
arriving at consensual policy solutions.
The Analytical Framework
Consider three players, A, B, and S. Player S is the stand-alone player. This player is
in possession of two items, a and b. Player A is interested in obtaining item a, and
player B is interested in obtaining item b. For concreteness, we may think of A and B
as member countries of the EU, and S as nonmember country, potentially a tax
haven, which negotiates about bilateral information exchange agreements or about
double tax treaties, but a and b can also be very different political concessions,
political favors, or other politically tradable goods. We assume that player S does
not attribute any value to items a and b (which is essentially a normalization assump-
tion) and that players A and B attribute values to receiving these goods that are equal
to vA 2 ½0; 1 and vB 2 ½0; 1. We assume that these values are draws from a joint
distribution with the cumulative distribution function FABðvA; vBÞ.
To allow for straightforward comparative static results on the distribution func-
tion, we consider the following two probability models for the joint distribution
FABðvA; vBÞ that allow us to describe a continuum between stochastic independence
and perfect positive or negative correlation by a single variable b 2 ½0; 1Þ:
FABðvA; vBÞ ¼ ð1 bÞ½ZðvAÞZðvBÞ þ bZðminfvA; vBgÞ; ð1Þ
for the case with positive correlation, and
FABðvA; vBÞ ¼ ð1 bÞ½ZðvAÞZðvBÞ þ bmaxfðvA þ vB  1Þ; 0gf ; ð2Þ
for the case with negative correlation. Here, ZðzÞ is the cumulative distribution func-
tion of a univariate random variable that is uniformly distributed on ½0; 1 and
b 2 ½0; 1Þ. Independence applies if vA and vB are two statistically independent draws
from the distribution ZðzÞ. This is the case in both equations (1) and (2) for b ¼ 0.
Perfect positive correlation applies in equation (1) if a single draw occurs and
z ¼ vA ¼ vB. Perfectly negative correlation occurs if there is a single draw, with
vA ¼ z and vB ¼ 1 z. These are the limit cases in equations (1) and (2) for
b! 1. Positive b smaller than 1 maps cases with some, but not perfect correlation.
This setup will allow us to make comparative static analysis via a change in b.5
The interaction between players is described by a version of the bargaining
framework with incomplete information that has been introduced by Harsanyi and
Selten (1972) and developed further by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983).
Player S can commit to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. We discuss several regimes.
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The regime and its rules are exogenously given, and the rules are common
knowledge.
In the standalone regime, player S makes separate offers to A and to B. These
offers are described by the asking prices pA 2 ½0; 1 and pB 2 ½0; 1: the compensa-
tion which S demands for the delivery of the items a and b to A and B, respectively.
Considering the tax-haven example, we may think of a and b as concessions such as
the willingness to answer information requests about account holders from
countries A and B, or bank secrecy rules, and pA and pB may be development aid
or other valuable benefits. Players A and B then consider these offers and each of
them decides separately whether to accept or reject the offer. This ends the game.
The payoffs accruing from these outcomes are pS ¼ yApA þ yBpB for player S and
pA ¼ yAðvA  pAÞ and pB ¼ yBðvB  pBÞ for players A and B, where yA and yB are
indicator variables taking values 1 and 0 if the individual player accepts or rejects
the offer.
In the coalition regime with weak ties, A and B are part of a specific type of col-
lective decision framework as follows: player S makes offers with asking prices pA
and pB. Then both A and B announce separately and simultaneously whether or not
they are willing to accept the price offer. The offers ðpA; pBÞ are collectively rejected
if at least one of the players announces rejection. Only if both players announce
acceptance does trade take place; A pays pA and receives a, B pays pB and receives
b. This regime resembles, for instance, negotiations of the EU with a nonmember
state. In these negotiations, each member state has a veto right. Whether or not a
nonmember country is admitted to the European free-trade area, or other changes
of the European Treaty that regulate interaction with nonmember states, with veto
rights of each member state, may serve as an illustration.
In the coalition regime with strong ties, players A and B can make a more pow-
erful commitment, involving an information exchange and side payments between
A and B in the event of the offer being accepted. Player S makes a joint offer
pA þ pB  pAB which is the asking price requested by S for the delivery of items
a to A and b to B. Now players A and B learn their reservation values vA and vB that
each holds. This information transfer is part of the coalition setup and is assumed to
be completely truthful.6 Players A and B make a decision about accepting or reject-
ing player S’s proposal. Players A and B apply an internal sharing rule such that, in
case of acceptance, they arrange for side payments to share any possible surplus
vA þ vB  pAB equally. If A or B objects to the deal, then no deal takes place. If both
players announce acceptance, then the items are delivered and the coalition of A and
B must jointly pay the price pAB. This regime may also apply for negotiations of the
EU on some matters. Explicit side payments in the EU are rare. However, the nego-
tiations on the size and spending categories in the multiannual financial framework
of the EU provide ample opportunities to agree on internal side payments.
In what follows, we solve these three games separately from each other. Then we
compare the outcomes for the asking price and for the coalition players. Readers
who are not interested in the formal analysis may jump to the comparison section
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directly; this section also offers some graphical explanation for the incentives that
are at work.
The Stand-alone Regime
Consider first the stand-alone regime. Player A knows his vA and receives an offer
with asking price pA. Player A accepts this offer if pA  vA and a deal as regards
a takes place. If pA > vA, then this offer is unfavorable for A, the player rejects and
a is not traded. Similarly for B. The decisions of A and B and the resulting trading
outcomes are unrelated in this regime. Given this, player S solves two separate, but
identical problems for A and B. Player S chooses asking prices that are determined by
pI ¼ arg max
p
fð1 ZðpÞÞpg for I 2 fA;Bg: ð3Þ
Given the assumptions about the marginal distributions, the optimal choice is the
same for both countries and is given by the solution to ð1 ZðpÞÞ  Z 0 ðpÞp ¼ 0,
which yields equilibrium prices and resulting ex ante expected payoffs for A, B, and
S of
pA ¼ pB ¼
1
2
; pA ¼ pB ¼ 1=8 and pS ¼ 1=2: ð4Þ
Figure 1 shows the range of possible combinations of vA 2 ½0; 1 and vB 2 ½0; 1 and
illustrates the equilibrium offers pA ¼ pB ¼ 1=2 for the stand-alone regime for
b ¼ 0 (stochastic independence).
At pA ¼ pB ¼ 1=2, a reduction in pA and pB by D has a price effect and a quantity
effect. It lowers the payment received by S if trade takes place (price effect), but it
increases the expected number of trades that take place by 2D (quantity effect). At
the equilibrium asking price, the price and quantity effect of a small increase or
decrease in the price just balance each other with respect to the payoff of S.
A Weak-ties Coalition
We turn next to the case of a weak-ties coalition. Let us first consider the decision of
one player, say player A for a given asking price pA. If pA < vA, then player A would
like to make the deal, and if pA > vA, then A is better-off if the deal does not take
place. Indifference prevails if pA ¼ vA. The optimal reply for player A is not only
a function of this comparison but also of the expectation about the acceptance deci-
sion of player B. We assume that vA and vB remain fully private information to the
players A and B in the weak-ties coalition and also that each player observes only the
price requested from him.7
The acceptance choice of player A can be conditional on vA and the price pA only,
and player S cannot observe an action or a signal that could make this player update
the prior belief about player A’s and player B’s type. It is easy to confirm that a
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perfect Bayesian equilibrium is characterized by decisions as follows:8 each player A
and B accepts if and only if the price requested is not higher than the player’s private
valuation. Player S anticipates this behavior and maximizes expected return
ðpA þ pBÞ½probðpA  vA and pB  vBÞ, which can be expressed as
ðpA þ pBÞ ð1 pA  pB þ FABðpA; pBÞÞ: ð5Þ
The term FABðpA; pBÞ is the probability that the actual values vA and vB are both
smaller than or equal to pA and pB. To choose pA and pB are in general no longer
separate problems from the perspective of player S, but the choice problems become
interdependent.
We first consider the case with positive correlation for a given b. Given the sym-
metry of the problem and the nature of the possible correlation, the optimal choice of
prices is symmetric, pA ¼ pB  p. In the case of stochastic independence (b ¼ 0),
we have FABðp; pÞ ¼ pp. In the full correlation case, we have FABðp; pÞ ¼ p. This
yields a payoff function equal to
pSðpÞ ¼ 2pð1 2pþ ð1 bÞppþ bpÞ: ð6Þ
Figure 1. For the asking price pA ¼ pB ¼ 1=2 both players accept if ðvA; vBÞ is inside the area
ab, only player A (resp. B) accepts if ðvA; vBÞ is inside a (resp. b). A reduction in the asking prices
by D increases the areas in which acceptance takes place.
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Maximization of this payoff yields
pðbÞ ¼ 1





This function has a positive slope on the whole interval of feasible b 2 ½0; 1Þ. The
optimal price offer by player S is highest for b! 1 and is lower as the valuations
of the two players become less stochastically correlated. The payoffs for A and B are
pA ¼ pB ¼ ð1 bÞ
ð1 pÞ3
2




Inserting the price equation (7) into equation (8) yields the equilibrium payoffs that
will be compared with the other regimes in the Comparing Regimes section.
Intuitively, the player with the lower valuation becomes crucial for whether trade
occurs or not. Tying their acceptance decisions to each other gives them some com-
mitment power. Reconsider Figure 1. In the weak-ties regime, for pA ¼ pB ¼ 0:5,
trade occurs only for combinations of ðvA; vBÞ in the area ab. Where one of the two
possible deals take place in the stand-alone regime for the areas a and b, player S
loses the gains from trade in the weak-ties regime in these cases. Anticipating this
higher requirement for trade to take place, player S lowers the aspirations and offers
the two items for a lower price. Commitment on weak ties therefore induces a lower
price offer, and this is beneficial for the two coalition players. On the negative side,
this commitment yields situations such as combinations as in a or in b in which one
player would like to accept the offer made to him but cannot, because the offer price
is higher than the other coalition player’s valuation. Commitment causes an addi-
tional inefficiency in these cases. Whether negotiating as a weak-ties coalition is
advantageous for players A and B is considered in a later section.
Turning to the case in which the valuations are either stochastically independent
or negatively correlated with probabilities ð1 bÞ and b, we can rewrite the payoff
function of player S as
2p½1 2pþ ð1 bÞppþ b½maxf0; ð1 2pÞg: ð9Þ
Maximization of this payoff for the (relevant) range p 2 ½0; 1=2 yields
pðbÞ ¼ 1





This function is monotonically decreasing in b for b 2 ½0; 1Þ. Hence, the price cho-
sen by player S is highest for b ¼ 0, that is, if the coalition members’ valuations are
stochastically independent. The payoff of players A and B becomes
pA ¼ pB ¼ ð1 bÞ
ð1 pÞ3
2




928 Journal of Conflict Resolution 58(5)
Inserting equation (10) into equation (11) yields the expected equilibrium payoff for
A and B.
We summarize the main qualitative results as follows:
Proposition 1: In the case with partial positive correlation, the lower the corre-
lation between the coalition members’ valuations, the lower the prices offered to
the weak coalition. In the case with partially negative correlation, the stronger
the negative correlation, the lower the prices offered to the weak-ties coalition.
Before completing the analysis of the weak-ties coalition, we briefly discuss why
the equilibrium underlying Proposition 1 is robust to changes in our information
assumptions. Suppose that A and B know the valuations vA and vB of both players
and also learn about both offers pA and pB. Consider player i’s optimal strategy for
given ðvA; vB; pA; pBÞ. If the other player j chooses to reject, then i’s choice is payoff
irrelevant. If j accepts, then i is pivotal. The strategy to articulate ‘‘accept’’ if and
only if pi  vi maximizes i’s payoff in this case. This is the same optimal decision
rule as in the case in which i can observe only vi and pi. In turn, if the reactions of A
and B to a choice of offers ðpA; pBÞ are the same as in the case in which each player i
can observe only pi and vi; then the choice of pA and pB by player S follows the same
logic, leading to the same equilibrium choices as in the equilibrium for weak
alliances that is underlying Proposition 1. This shows that our analysis does not
depend on the particular information assumption we make.
A Strong-ties Coalition
A coalition with strong ties provides the players who are members of this coalition
with a joint payoff function. Maximizing this joint payoff, they jointly accept the
offer by player S if pA þ pB ¼ pAB  vA þ vB, otherwise they reject the offer.9 The
probability for acceptance is, hence,
QðpABÞ  probðvA þ vB  pABÞ ¼
Z 1
0
probðvB  pAB  x vA ¼ xj ÞZ
0 ðxÞdx;
where the probðvB  pAB  xÞ is determined by the joint distribution of vA and vB,
and ZðxÞ is the marginal distribution for vA. Player S maximizes pQðpÞ, and the
payoff maximizing sum of prices, pAB, generally depends on the joint distribution
FABðvA; vBÞ. For the case of independence, which occurs with probability ð1 bÞ,
the distribution of vA þ vB is triangular with support ½0; 2 and symmetric around
1. This makes the probability that vA þ vB  pAB equal to
probðvA þ vB  pABÞ ¼
1 ðp2AB=2Þ for pAB 2 ð0; 1Þ
ð2 pABÞ2=2 for pAB 2 ð1; 2Þ:

We now consider positive and negative correlation consecutively.
Konrad and Cusack 929
The case of positive correlation is a linear combination of stochastic independence
and perfect positive correlation. Anticipating that the solution to the problem is
in the range pAB 2 ½0; 1, the objective function of player S for a given b can be
written as
pSðpABÞ ¼ ð1 bÞpABð1 ðp2AB=2ÞÞ þ bpABð1 ðpAB=2ÞÞ: ð12Þ
The first term in this payoff function considers the case in which the valuations are
stochastically independent, which has a probability weight of ð1 bÞ. For
stochastically independent valuations, player S earns the price pAB with a probability
ð1 ðp2AB=2ÞÞ. The second term refers to the case of perfect positive correlation
which is relevant with probability b. For perfect positive correlation, player S earns
the price pAB with the probability that vA þ vB  pAB, which is equal to 1 ðpAB=2Þ.
The function (equation [12]) takes on a maximum at
pABðbÞ ¼
1
3 1 bð Þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi





for given b with b 2 ½0; 1Þ. The function pABðbÞ is monotonically increasing in b.
The payoff maximizing price is higher if the valuations vA and vB are more corre-




VðV  pABÞdV þ
Z 2
1
ð2 V ÞðV  pABÞdV ¼ 1þ
1
6
p3AB  pAB; ð14Þ
where V  vA þ vB. The joint expected payoff of A and B in the case of perfect cor-






. The expected payoff for each of the two coalition play-
ers as a function of pAB and b then is
pA ¼ pB ¼
1
2












Inserting pAB from equation (13) into equation (15) yields the sum of these equili-
brium payoffs of A and B as a function of b and pAB that will be used in the section
below that compares regimes.
Turn now to the case with stochastic independence with probability ð1 bÞ and
perfect negative correlation with probability b 2 ½0; 1Þ. The payoffs as a function of
pAB for the case of independence have been calculated already. For the case of
negative correlation, the probability that vA þ vB  pAB is equal to 1 for pAB  1 and
equal to zero for pAB > 1. The expected payoff of player S is
pSðpABÞ ¼ ð1 bÞpABð1 ðp2AB=2ÞÞ þ bpAB; ð16Þ
for pAB 2 ½0; 1. Maximization of equation (16) yields



















, which is increasing in b
and takes a maximum of 1 for b! 1.
The expected equilibrium payoff of each of the players A and B is
pA ¼ pB ¼
1
2








for pAB 2 ð0; 1Þ. Using the price (equation [17]) that maximizes the payoff of player
S, for b 2 ð0; ð1=3ÞÞ, this yields the equilibrium payoffs to be used for a comparison
of regimes in the following section. Summarizing, we find
Proposition 2: In the case of a coalition with strong ties, the price offered is lower
the more stochastically independent the valuations of players A and B are.
Comparing Regimes
We can now compare the asking prices and equilibrium payoffs in the different
regimes for the same values of b 2 ½0; 1Þ. Before turning to a comparison of the alge-
braic results numerically, we consider diagrammatically why player S has an incen-
tive to choose lower asking prices in the two coalition regimes compared to the
equilibrium prices in the stand-alone regime. We focus on the case of stochastic
independence ðb ¼ 0Þ.
The equilibrium for the stand-alone regime for b ¼ 0 is mapped in Figure 1 by
pA ¼ pB ¼ 1=2. It is also the starting point for a discussion of player S’s incentives
in Figure 2a. For the weak-ties regime, at prices pA ¼ pB ¼ 0:5 trade takes place
with probability corresponding to the area ab, and if it takes place, it takes place with
both players. The expected number of units traded is therefore 2(ab) ¼ 0:5. This
smaller expected number of trades compared to aþ bþ 2ðabÞ in the stand-alone
regime means that the ‘‘price effect’’ of a reduction in prices is smaller at
pA ¼ pB ¼ 0:5: S loses revenue from a reduction in prices on a smaller number of
trades in this regime than in the stand-alone regime. Moreover, if S reduces the
prices at 0.5 by D, the increase in probability that trade takes place with both players
is equal the shaded area (‘‘quantity effect’’). This quantity effect affects two units of
trade, one with A and one with B. Hence, the increase in expected quantity traded at
pA ¼ pB ¼ 0:5 is equal to 2D, exactly the same as in the stand-alone regime. In the
stand-alone regime, the price effect and the quantity effect just balanced each other
at pA ¼ pB ¼ 1=2. In the weak-ties regime, the quantity effect is the same, but the
price effect is smaller. This explains why S prefers to set a lower price in the
weak-ties regime than in the stand-alone regime.
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For the strong-ties regime, consider Figure 2b. Starting the discussion again at
pA ¼ pB ¼ 0:5, trade of two units takes place for all combinations of valuations in
the area to the upper right of the line from the upper-left corner ð1; 0Þ to the
lower-right corner ð1; 0Þ. In expectation, one unit is traded at these prices, which
is the same expected number of trades as for the stand-alone regime. A reduction
in both prices by D starting from pA ¼ pB ¼ 0:5 generates a reduction of
pAB ¼ pA þ pB of size 2D. For small D, this increases the expected number of trades
by 4D, and this increase is larger than for the stand-alone regime. For the strong-ties
regime, the price effect is the same as in the stand-alone regime, but the quantity
effect is larger. This explains why S has an incentive to choose lower prices in the
strong-ties regime than in the stand-alone regime.
We now turn to the algebraic results in the previous sections and use them to
compare equilibrium prices.
Prices. Figures 3a and 3b show the equilibrium prices for the three regimes (solid line:
stand-alone regime; dashed line: weak ties; dotted line: strong ties). Both types of
coalition have a strategic effect on the asking price chosen by player S. The price
reduction is largest if the valuations vA and vB are stochastically independent and
weakens as positive correlation increases. The effects differ quantitatively for pos-
itive correlation (Figure 3a) and negative correlation (Figure 3b).
Consider the intuition for the weak-ties regime. If players A and B are more likely
to have similar valuations (positive correlation), then the fact that their agreements
are tied to each other by weak ties has a smaller impact compared to making separate
offers to each of them. The risk is smaller that trade with A that would have taken
place in the stand-alone regime at some prevailing price is prevented by a low
Figure 2. (a) For the asking price pA ¼ pB ¼ 1=2, both players accept and trade takes place if
ðvA; vBÞ is inside the area ab. (b) For pA ¼ pB ¼ 1=2, both players accept and trade takes place
if ðvA; vBÞ is inside the area ab.
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valuation of B. For perfect positive correlation, this risk completely disappears. For
negative correlation, from the information perspective of player S who does not
know the actual values vA and vB, the player must attribute a large likelihood to that
actual valuations of A and B are very different. This makes S more cautious and
reduces the asking prices in the weak-ties regime.
For strong ties, due to side payments, the comparison that decides about accep-
tance or rejection is whether pAB  vA þ vB. When S makes an offer, S does not
know the actual values vA þ vB, but maximizes an expected payoff using the distri-
bution from which the actual values vA þ vB are drawn. For negative correlation, the
distribution of vA þ vB shows less dispersion, making its value more predictable for
S. This is most evident for the case of perfect negative correlation, in which case
vA þ vB is equal to 1 with probability 1. All uncertainty about the coalition players’
joint willingness to pay disappears in this case. Player S can then set pAB ¼ 1 and
extract all rents from the coalition players. This effect is weaker, but also at work
if the distribution FAB exhibits some, but not perfect negative correlation: this
reduces the uncertainty that player S faces and tends to reduce the information rent
which players A and B enjoy in the equilibrium.
Payoffs. This type of logic can also be used to explain the results when considering
the equilibrium payoffs of players A and B. Figures 4a and 4b shows these payoffs
for positive correlation (left) and for negative correlation (right).
Compare first the coalition with weak ties with the benchmark case. For the full
range of positive correlation b 2 ½0; 1Þ, the coalition players’ payoff exceeds their
payoff in the benchmark case. Only in the case of perfect positive correlation
(b! 1) is the payoff not different from the benchmark payoff. Intuitively, the stra-
tegic effect on the asking price is stronger than the inefficiency emerging from the
unanimity requirement. As b! 1 unanimity does not impose an additional require-




















Figure 3. Equilibrium asking price for the case of positive correlation (3a) and negative corre-
lation (3b). Black (solid): stand-alone; green (dashed): weak ties; and blue (dotted): strong ties.
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weak ties. For negative correlation, there is a similar intuition. Negative correlation
makes the unanimity requirement a very strong condition and yields strong commit-
ment. However, this unanimity also causes inefficiency. Still, unless the negative
correlation is perfect, the commitment effect on prices for the payoff of A and B
is stronger than the payoff loss for A and B that is caused by the inefficiency.
Turn now to a comparison with the strong-ties coalition. Unanimity also has the
potential to make player S more cautious regarding the price charged in this regime,
compared to the stand-alone regime. On the other hand, due to the summing up and
splitting the surplus from any deal that is made, one coalition player does not prevent
the other coalition player from making a very valuable deal, provided that the two
deals together generate a joint surplus to them. The focus on joint surplus induces
the coalition to purchase both items even if the valuation for one of the items is small
in comparison to the total asking price, provided that the second item is sufficiently
highly valued. The seller need not be too afraid of charging a high price in total, as
the higher valuation for one item may compensate the low valuation of the second
item that might prevail. However, there is still some inefficiency from the fact that
both items can only be traded jointly, such that a very low valuation for one item
may jeopardize the trade in the second item even if this has a very high valuation.
Overall, in the case of stochastic independence, the average price per item
charged in the strong coalition regime is still lower than in the stand-alone regime.
This yields a higher payoff for the coalition players, compared to the stand-alone
outcomes. This joint effect also holds for moderate positive or negative correlation.
If the valuations of the coalition players become strongly positively correlated and
eventually identical, at that point commitment from potentially different valuations
vanishes and the problem degenerates to one that is equivalent to the situation where
player S makes an offer to one single stand-alone player. This is why the payoff in
this regime returns to the payoff in the benchmark case for positive correlation with



























Figure 4. Equilibrium payoffs for coalition members for positive correlation (4a) and negative
correlation (4b). Black (solid): stand-alone; green (dashed): weak ties; and blue (dotted): strong ties.
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uncertainty as regards the sum of their valuations in the strong-ties coalition. Uncer-
tainty about their joint valuation generates an information rent to them. With the dis-
appearance of this uncertainty, the information rent attached to it also melts away.
This is why the payoff of coalition players sharply declines as the negative correla-
tion becomes large.
One can also look at a comparison between the two coalition regimes. None of the
regimes globally dominates the other. The strategic price effect in the case of weak
ties is more robust to changes in the joint distribution of valuations than in the case of
strong ties, but there are joint distributions FAB for which the payoff of the coalition
is higher with strong ties than with weak ties.
Efficiency. The three regimes can also be compared with respect to efficiency, defined as
the expected sum of the payoffs of all three players. The efficiency benchmark is the
situation in which no rent is lost. This happens if trade always takes place. The sum
of rents in this case is equal to EðvA þ vBÞ ¼ 1 in expectation. For the stand-alone
regime, the expected rent is equal to the sum of the equilibrium payoffs for players
A, B, and S, and, using equation (4) these sum up to 3/4 (the solid line in Figures 5a and
5b). We can also use the respective equilibrium prices and payoffs and sum up payoffs
of all three players for the weak-ties regime and for the strong-ties regime, for positive
and negative correlation. Plotting these rents yields Figures 5a (positive correlation) and
5b (negative correlation). These show that the strong-ties case (dotted lines) has the best
efficiency properties and that efficiency is lowest in the weak-ties regime (broken lines).
Full efficiency is reached in the strong-ties regime with perfect negative correlation; pri-
vate information disappears in this case, but this is to the disadvantage of the coalition of
players A and B who lose all rent in this regime at this point.
Endogenous Regimes? The analysis of equilibrium payoffs suggests that joint negoti-























Figure 5. Efficiency relative to full efficiency for the three regimes for positive correlation
(5a) and negative correlation (5b). Black (solid): stand-alone; green (dashed): weak ties; and
blue (dotted): strong ties.
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compared to stand-alone negotiations. We have considered and compared exogen-
ously given regimes. But where coalitions are voluntarily formed, our results suggest
that coalitions should be more frequently observed than without this strategic
advantage.
We would not conclude from this that coalitions should be ubiquitous, however.
Too many other aspects may play a role if coalitions are endogenous. First, the deci-
sion whether to form a coalition and with whom may reveal or signal certain types of
information to players outside the coalition. This is not a problem if the decision to
form a coalition takes place before A and B learn about their true valuations. In this
case, no information is revealed because the players make their coalition choices
while they are still uninformed themselves. But for many situations, they may
already have some private information at the point of time when a coalition could
be formed. In our context, the incentive for A and B to enter into a coalition depends
on their actual valuations; accordingly, if these are, or could be, known prior to such
decisions, they would signal information and affect the price offers (Wagner 2004).
Second, the formation of a coalition—or abstaining from one—may convey or signal
information to noncoalition players that may be relevant in other contexts.10 Third,
coming back to negotiations by the EU and its member states with nonmember states
or other groups: acting as a coalition in negotiations with tax havens for information
exchange agreements or with other countries for double taxation treaties may yield
strategic advantages. However, this would compromise the principles according to
which competence on tax policy is strictly on the nation level and not at the
European level. And member countries may not want to sacrifice their national
sovereignty on tax policy for the strategic advantages in negotiating international tax
conventions. Fourth, bargaining as a coalition requires the ability to commit. If one
of the members of a coalition prefers to accept his offer, but the other does not, this
member is tempted to default and to accept the offer anyway. In many institutional
frameworks, a sufficient degree of commitment may not be feasible.11 Fifth, coali-
tion formation is a dynamic process which is sensitive to what happens if some
player joins or departs from a given coalition.12
Our analysis also shows that the strategic advantage of a coalition is higher for
strong-ties coalitions compared to weak-ties coalitions, at least for a broad parameter
range. Strong-ties coalitions, however, require side payments (transferable utility).
As discussed also in the context of the EU example, the frontiers between weak and
strong ties are difficult to draw, as side payments may occur with a delay, and in a
larger cooperative context. Generally, contracts on side payments may be costly to
implement, to execute, and to enforce.
Another aspect that makes an empirical test of the theory difficult is the concep-
tual difference between countries’ symmetry ex ante (the type distribution from
which vi are drawn) and potential symmetry or asymmetry ex post (the actual values
of viÞ. Unless coalitions negotiate repeatedly in a context that is time invariant, the
correlation between the reservation prices of members of a coalition is difficult to
assess. All this, plus historical and institutional idiosyncrasies make it difficult to
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develop an empirical strategy. However, the problem can be suitably studied in
laboratory experiments and clear-cut predictions can be tested more systematically.
This is something we would like to explore in the future.
Conclusion
This article examines the role of coalitions in bargaining problems with one-sided
incomplete information in which one uninformed player can offer two informed
players one item each. This uninformed player is the proposer and makes take-it-
or-leave-it offers. The two informed players are the responders. We study two types
of coalitions between two responders and compare the coalition outcomes with sep-
arate take-it-or-leave-it offers to each of the informed players. Coalitions are under-
stood here as commitment devices that allow players to make their acceptance
decision for the offers they receive in a joint decision fashion. We compare how a
coalition between the informed responders and its internal governance structure
affects the price offers made by the uninformed player. If the responders are joined
in coalition, this typically reduces the price which the uninformed player bids. This
is the strategic price effect for the responders being in a coalition. The coalitions also
have an efficiency effect. Since it turns separate decisions into joint decisions, it may
cause joint rejection where, given the asking prices, players may jointly prefer one of
them to accept the offer made, whereas the other player is better-off not accepting
the offer. While there is no general conclusion regarding whether acting as a coali-
tion is superior to a stand-alone regime, and, in which case, what type of coalition
should be chosen, the analysis reveals strong strategic effects of coalition formation,
strengthening the coalition’s power in negotiations with an uninformed outsider.
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Notes
1. Eppstein, Gerlach, and Huser (2010, 10), for instance, describe the difficulties and the
internal debate among member states during the Copenhagen climate summit.
2. Whether this type of coalition negotiations is closer to the case with side payments or to
the case without side payments depends on the internal governance structure of the
European Union. It may often be difficult to assess whether a given European program
with redistributional impact was, in fact, a compensation payment.
3. An example is government debt, and the government’s incentive to default on this debt
rather than charge distortionary taxes to service this debt. Stasavage (2002), for instance,
analyzes this incentive focusing on the historical example of England and the roles of
multiple veto players and multiplicity of policy issues for achieving credibility.
4. The problems of formation of alliances have received considerable attention. An impor-
tant example is Hyndman and Ray (2007), who analyze a very general and rich frame-
work with a dynamic process of coalitions being formed and altered as an equilibrium
process, complemented by a process of negotiations.
5. The probability model that generates equation (1) can be seen as a two-stage compound
lottery: in a first stage, it is randomly decided whether a single draw from ZðzÞ is made
and z ¼ vA ¼ vB, or whether two statistically independent draws of vA and vB are made.
The probability for a single draw is b. In a second stage, z is drawn (once or twice, respec-
tively). This two-stage lottery generates FABðvA; vBÞ as in equation (1) as a linear combi-
nation of two distributions of ðvA; vBÞ, one with perfect correlation and one with
stochastic independence. The construction of equation (2) is analogous. But in this case,
with probability b, the single draw of z yields vA ¼ z and vB ¼ 1 z, and with probability
1 b, the values vA and vB are statistically independent draws.
6. Bearce, Flanagen, and Floros (2006) pointed out that information transfer is an essential
element of the formation of alliances. Konrad (2012) used this insight in a conflict frame-
work in which an information transfer about military capacity is the only aspect of the
formation of alliances.
7. We depart from this assumption allowing A and B to observe each other’s valuation and
the price offer at the end of this section. The equilibrium we find under mutual unobser-
vability is robust to this change in the information assumptions.
8. It is easy to confirm that there is a second type of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in which A
and B always reject all offers. Rejecting is mutually optimal for A and B in the continuation
game: as none of the players has any influence on the outcome, given that the other player
rejects the offer, ‘‘reject’’ yields the same payoff as ‘‘accept.’’ In turn, if S anticipates this
behavior, S may choose any offer price. We do not consider this type of equilibrium in what
follows, because it is not robust to refinements. For instance, if the accept/reject decisions of
A and B are perturbed, or if A and B choose sequentially, this equilibrium disappears, whereas
the equilibrium which we consider further is robust with respect to such refinements.
9. Like in the weak-ties regime, there is a second, nonrobust equilibrium in which both
alliance players reject all offers because they think that the other player is about to reject
any offer, so their own decision is inconsequential for the decision outcome.
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10. Roy (1994) and Sagan and Suri (2003) offer examples for such signals that may serve to
build reputation and may allow to make threats credible that would not be credible among
purely rational players.
11. It should be noted that since Thucydides and later Machiavelli, many analysts have been
skeptical, for instance, of the wartime reliability of alliance partners to live up to their
commitments. A more recent example of this is to be seen in Schmidt’s (1953) discussion
of the phrase Perfidious Albion. Indeed, early quantitative work in political science
(Sabrosky 1980) concluded that the failure rate was about 75 percent. A modest one in
four chance of an ally living up to its commitments is not a very reassuring situation
in a violent, anarchic world. More recent and detailed empirical work (Leeds, Long, and
Mitchell, 2000; Leeds 2003) shows, however, that the level of reliability is far higher and,
as a consequence, the failure to keep commitments likely only 25 percent of the time.
Importantly, these failures are often the product of changes since the commitment was
made that have reduced the costs of failing to keep the commitment or changes that have
transpired within the alliance.
12. Coalition formation and its evolution is typically a dynamic process. For a study of some
of the several aspects with several types of group interaction, see Ray and Vohra (2001),
Konishi and Ray (2003), and Hyndman and Ray (2007).
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